Regulating Central Bank Digital Currencies: Financial Stability, Legal Foundations and Implications for Azerbaijan
PRAKKOM.AZ, Digital Law Lab və TechLaw.az tərəfindən təşkil olunan Rəqəmsal Hüquq üzrə Akademik Məqalə Müsabiqəsi çərçivəsində III yer qalibi Zeynalabidin Hüseynovun Mərkəzi Bank rəqəmsal valyutalarının maliyyə sabitliyinə təsiri, hüquqi əsasları və Azərbaycanda tətbiqi perspektivlərinə həsr olunmuş tədqiqat işini təqdim edirik.
Məqalə: REGULATING CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES: FINANCIAL STABILITY, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AZERBAIJAN
Abstract
This article examines the legal nature of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), their place in the modern monetary system, and their potential implications for financial stability. It analyses the possible impact of CBDCs on the deposit base of commercial banks and financial intermediation and considers the main regulatory principles governing their introduction. The article also assesses the existing legal framework for introducing a digital manat in Azerbaijan and proposes legislative improvements. Drawing on the experiences of The Bahamas and China, it identifies possible regulatory approaches for Azerbaijan concerning the legal status of CBDCs, the preservation of financial stability, privacy, and AML/CFT requirements.
Keywords: CBDC, money flower, financial stability, central bank, AML/CFT, IMF, Sand Dollar, e-CNY , digital manat.
I. Introduction
The rapid digitalisation of the financial system in the twenty-first century has broadened discussions about the nature of money and its future forms. This process entered a new phase with the emergence of Bitcoin and the subsequent development of private digital assets such as stablecoins. The spread of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, which do not rely on a central issuer, followed by stablecoins that seek to maintain a stable value by reference to traditional currencies and other assets, has made discussions about the existence of money in digital form increasingly relevant. Against this background, central banks have also begun exploring the possibility of issuing sovereign money in digital form, and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) have become an important area of development in the modern monetary system
However, the introduction of a CBDC cannot be regarded merely as a change in the form of money. Making central bank money available to the general public in digital form raises important questions about its legal status and relationship to other forms of money, as well as its potential effects on commercial banks' funding models and financial stability more broadly. As analysed in this article, the shift of bank deposits into CBDCs may, under certain conditions, affect the funding base of commercial banks and create a risk of bank disintermediation. At the same time, the digital features of CBDCs also raise issues such as balancing the protection of user privacy with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) requirements.
In this respect, the successful introduction of a CBDC largely depends on its appropriate legal design. This article aims to identify the theoretical and legal foundations of CBDCs within the modern monetary system, analyse their potential implications for financial stability and the fundamental principles of their regulation, and, drawing on international experience, propose the legal and regulatory approaches necessary for the future introduction of a CBDC in Azerbaijan. This issue is particularly relevant for Azerbaijan, as the introduction of a CBDC has already been identified as a specific area of the country’s digital development policy, with the development and implementation of the relevant platform included in the Action Plan for 2026-2028.
II. The Theoretical and Legal Foundations of Central Bank Digital Currencies in the Modern Monetary System
To understand CBDCs, it is first necessary to consider several legal aspects of money's existence. Money exists in the economy mainly in two forms: money issued by the central bank and deposit money created by commercial banks.
The only form of central bank-issued money currently available to the general public is cash. Cash exists in the form of coins and banknotes, which are physical monetary instruments representing a certain monetary value. Actual possession of such a monetary instrument gives rise to legal ownership of it. Cash payments are made through the direct transfer of monetary instruments from one person to another, without the need for any third party, such as a bank, to validate the transaction.
Deposit money created by commercial banks, in turn, is created as commercial banks accept deposits and extend loans on the basis of those funds. This money exists in the form of deposits held in bank accounts and is used through debit cards, credit cards, bank transfers, and other electronic payment instruments. At the request of the account holder, these deposits may be converted into cash and thus into a form of money issued by the central bank. The circulation of commercial bank money is based on public confidence that banks will meet their obligations and that deposits will be kept safe.
Electronic money issued by non-bank entities, meanwhile, reflects a claim on commercial bank deposits and, indirectly, on cash. The principal difference between central bank money, on the one hand, and commercial bank money and electronic money issued by non-bank entities, on the other, is therefore that central bank money is not exposed to default risk, whereas commercial bank money and electronic money carry the risk that their issuers may be unable to meet their obligations, that is, the risk of default.
The conclusion that follows is that, at present, no payment instrument other than cash has the status of legal tender. It is precisely for this reason that a CBDC is regarded as the creation of a new digital form of central bank money available to the general public. In other words, as the digital equivalent of cash, a CBDC differs from commercial bank deposits because it is issued directly by the central bank.
A CBDC is defined as a digital form of central bank money that differs from balances held in traditional reserve or settlement accounts8 . In other words, a CBDC is digital money issued by a central bank, denominated in the national unit of account, and representing a liability of the central bank. Where a CBDC is intended for use by the general public, it is referred to as a general-purpose or retail CBDC. In this respect, a CBDC provides individuals and legal entities with a new means of storing value and making payments.
CBDCs differ fundamentally from existing cashless payment instruments used by consumers and businesses, such as credit transfers, direct debit payments, card payments, and electronic money. While these payment instruments represent liabilities of private financial institutions, a CBDC constitutes a direct claim on the central bank and is therefore a liability of the central bank.
Unlike retail CBDCs, wholesale CBDCs are intended for a different group of users, namely financial institutions. In substance, a wholesale CBDC is similar to existing central bank reserves and settlement accounts. Its main purpose is to facilitate large-value interbank payments or to enable the settlement of transactions involving tokenised financial assets in central bank money within new digital infrastructures.
To distinguish the forms of money discussed above and determine the place of CBDCs within the existing monetary system, Morten Bech and Rodney Garratt proposed a classification model in 2017 known as the “money flower”. This model classifies different forms of money according to four main characteristics: i) issuer (central bank or other); ii) form (electronic or physical); iii) accessibility (universal or limited); and iv) transfer mechanism (centralised or decentralised, i.e. peer-to-peer).

Figure 1. The money flower: a taxonomy of money
Source: Bech and Garratt (2017), p. 60.
As shown in the figure, none of the traditional forms of money fully combines the characteristics associated with a CBDC. Cash is issued by the central bank and is widely accessible to the public, but it is not digital. Commercial bank deposits are both digital and widely accessible, but they are not issued by the central bank. Funds held in central bank reserve and settlement accounts are both digital and represent liabilities of the central bank, but access to them is generally limited to financial institutions.
The “money flower” model illustrates the position of CBDCs among these traditional forms of money. In the classification developed by Bech and Garratt, retail CBCC is presented as central bank money that exists in electronic form, is issued by the central bank, is widely accessible to the public, and can be transferred on a peer-to-peer basis. Wholesale CBCC is likewise electronic, issued by the central bank, and transferable on a peer-to-peer basis, but unlike retail CBCC, it is intended not for the general public but for a limited group of users, primarily financial institutions.
According to one approach in the literature, CBDC may be regarded as the next stage in the evolution from metal coins to metal-backed banknotes and subsequently to fiat money. It is argued that, if CBDC can preserve most of the key desirable characteristics of money, it may have the potential to replace existing physical cash in the future. At the same time, CBDC could complement electronic money included in the M1 monetary aggregate by performing similar functions or could serve as a fully backed means of settlement.
However, we do not agree with this view. In our opinion, CBDC cannot be regarded as the next stage in the evolution of money and should only be considered an alternative form of legal tender alongside cash. The complete replacement of cash by CBDC would not only be impracticable but could also lead to significant economic problems. Indeed, the approach we advocate is recognised as one of the key principles governing the introduction of CBDCs. We will develop this argument further in the following sections of the article.
III. Financial Stability and Foundational Principles for the Regulation of Central Bank Digital Currencies
The introduction of a CBDC may offer a number of potential benefits, including improving the efficiency and resilience of payment systems, expanding financial inclusion, reducing the costs associated with the issuance and circulation of cash, and preserving monetary sovereignty amid the growing use of private digital money. In addition, by providing a reliable alternative to private stablecoins, a CBDC may also help reduce certain financial stability risks that could arise from their widespread use.
At the same time, the issuance of a CBDC may itself create new financial stability risks by affecting the existing structure of the financial system, particularly the funding model of commercial banks. One of the main concerns in this regard is the possibility that deposits held by households and businesses with commercial banks may shift into CBDCs, thereby weakening the role of banks in financial intermediation.
A survey conducted in Germany on public attitudes towards CBDCs and the potential changes in asset portfolios following their introduction shows that the launch of a CBDC could lead to a certain degree of outflow from bank deposits into digital central bank money. Among respondents interested in CBDCs, a non-interest-bearing digital euro was found to account, on average, for 21% of their financial portfolios. Under a hypothetical CBDC introduction scenario, the amount of funds held by respondents in bank deposits was projected to decline by approximately 27% on average. The authors’ findings indicate that, although funds shifted into CBDCs would come from different types of assets, bank deposits would experience the largest proportional decline13 . This suggests that, if CBDCs were introduced on a large scale, there would be a real risk of contraction in the deposit base of commercial banks, which constitutes a stable and relatively inexpensive source of funding.

Figure 2. Portfolio decisions of households in normal times.
Source: Bidder, Jackson & Rottner (2025), Figure 1, p. 9.
The shift of bank deposits into CBDCs also gives rise to the risk of bank disintermediation. Since deposits constitute a relatively inexpensive and stable source of funding for commercial banks, the substitution of bank deposits by CBDCs may narrow banks’ funding base and, consequently, affect their lending capacity.
This effect is possible, but the question is whether it is capable of seriously destabilising the banking sector. In our view, where a CBDC is built on an appropriate legal framework and a strong free-market economy exists, it may not only avoid causing harm but may also generate certain benefits. This is because the introduction of a CBDC does not automatically lead to a decline in bank deposits. On the contrary, by creating an alternative to bank deposits, a CBDC may strengthen competition in the deposit market and encourage commercial banks to offer higher interest rates on deposits. This could lead some depositors to keep more funds in bank deposits, thereby offsetting the effects of fund flows into CBDCs.
However, these positive outcomes can only be achieved through the proper legal design of a CBDC. The central issue, therefore, is the principles and safeguards on which such a design should be based.
In 2020, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), together with the Bank of Canada, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, Sveriges Riksbank, the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of England, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, published Central bank digital currencies: foundational principles and core features, which identified three foundational principles that central banks should follow when considering the issuance of CBDCs: i) do no harm; ii) coexistence; and iii) innovation and efficiency.
Under the “do no harm” principle, the introduction of a CBDC should not undermine the central bank’s core functions of maintaining monetary and financial stability; rather, it should support existing public policy objectives. The central bank’s mandate to maintain monetary and financial stability, which is established by law in many countries, should remain intact and should neither be interfered with nor hindered in its implementation.
It should be noted that, under Article 4 of the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Central Bank, without prejudice to its primary objective, the Central Bank ensures financial stability within the powers established by the laws regulating financial markets. In addition, under Article 5 of the same Law, one of the functions of the Central Bank is to ensure the stable and sustainable operation of financial markets and to carry out regulation and supervision of financial markets, including macroprudential regulation and supervision18 . In our view, these provisions provide the basis for the application of the “do no harm” principle in Azerbaijan, and the introduction of a CBDC cannot justify any departure from these principles.
Under the second foundational principle, coexistence, a CBDC should not replace existing forms of money but should instead complement them. In this respect, a CBDC should operate alongside both cash and other forms of central bank money, as well as reliable forms of private money such as commercial bank deposits. At the same time, access to cash should be maintained for as long as there is sufficient public demand for it.
A CBDC should also promote innovation and competition in the payment system, thereby contributing to its safety, efficiency, and accessibility, in accordance with the principle of “innovation and efficiency”. Throughout this process, the parallel involvement of the public and private sectors should be maintained, and users’ freedom to choose among different means of payment should not be restricted.
Thus, the successful introduction of a CBDC appears possible when at least these three principles are applied together. It should also be borne in mind that, from the perspective of the legal regulation of CBDCs, the activities of central banks should be directed towards achieving public policy objectives rather than generating profit. The above-mentioned joint report by the BIS and seven central banks specifically emphasises that, unlike private payment service providers, central banks pursue public policy objectives rather than profit. In addition, the Bank of Canada has identified issuance by an institution that prioritises the public interest and does not have a commercial motive as one of the important characteristics of a potential CBDC.
This approach is also reflected in the legal status of central banks. For example, under Article 127 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union21 and Article 2 of the Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank22 , the primary objective of the European System of Central Banks is to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to price stability, the System must also support the general economic policies of the Union. As the European Central Bank itself has stated, its activities are not aimed at generating profit; rather, any profit or loss arising from its activities is a by-product of pursuing the central bank’s primary objectives.
A similar approach is expressly reflected in Azerbaijani legislation. Article 4 of the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Central Bank directly provides that making a profit is not the primary objective of the Central Bank. Thus, there is broad international agreement that public policy objectives should take precedence over commercial interests in the activities of central banks.
In our view, particular attention should also be paid to this issue when introducing digital central bank money into circulation. Although the issuance of a CBDC may generate certain financial benefits for the central bank, including seigniorage revenue, generating such revenue should not become an independent objective of issuing a CBDC or expanding its use. For this reason, in addition to the three foundational principles discussed above, we propose that the “primacy of public purpose over profit” be considered a fourth foundational principle for the legal regulation of CBDCs.
IV . Future Regulation of Central Bank Digital Currency in Azerbaijan and Proposals in This Area
The introduction of a CBDC in Azerbaijan has become one of the areas of the country’s digital financial policy in recent years. Initial steps in this direction can be observed at least as early as 2022. In its Statement on the Main Directions of Monetary and Financial Stability Policy for 2022, the Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan stated that it would continue assessing the possibility of introducing a CBDC in the medium term. The Central Bank identified five main areas for this assessment: i) clarifying the policy, purpose, and objectives for the introduction of a digital currency; ii) involving stakeholders in the process; iii) establishing the legislative framework; iv) assessing the potential for the use of next-generation technologies; and v) assessing the level of market readiness.
A more concrete stage in the introduction of a CBDC began in 2026. The Action Plan for 2026–2028 on Accelerating Digital Development in the Republic of Azerbaijan, approved by the Order of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan dated 27 February 2026, identifies the implementation of a Central Bank Digital Currency platform and its integration into the ecosystem as a separate measure aimed at increasing cost efficiency and transparency in financial transactions.
The Action Plan also sets out a specific roadmap for the introduction of a CBDC. According to the Plan, the initial stage involves developing the conceptual model of the platform, its policy objectives, and its functional and technical requirements. This is to be followed by the selection of appropriate technological solutions and the determination of the platform architecture and suitable model. The final stage provides for the development of a simple and functional version of the platform, the establishment of the technological infrastructure, testing, and implementation. The deadline for implementing the measure is December 2028, with the Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan designated as the principal implementing authority.
In our view, the planned introduction of a CBDC at the state level makes it necessary to determine its legal status within the existing monetary legislation. In this respect, it must first be established whether the Central Bank’s existing issuance authority extends to the issuance of central bank money in digital form.
Under Article 19 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the monetary unit of the Republic of Azerbaijan is the manat, and the right to issue and withdraw monetary instruments from circulation belongs exclusively to the Central Bank. At the same time, the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Central Bank grants the Central Bank the authority to organise the issuance of monetary instruments and ensure their circulation. Thus, given the Central Bank’s exclusive authority in the field of money issuance, determining the issuer of a CBDC does not present a fundamental legal problem.
However, the issue arises from the subject matter and form of the Central Bank’s issuance authority as defined under the existing legislation. Under Article 36.1 of the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Central Bank, monetary instruments may be put into circulation in the form of paper money and coins. Thus, the existing legislation expressly defines the physical forms of money that may be issued into circulation by the Central Bank and does not separately provide for the issuance of central bank money in digital form.
In our view, based on a broad interpretation of the Central Bank’s exclusive issuance authority established by the Constitution, it is possible to argue that this authority also extends to CBDCs. However, such an interpretation is not sufficient for the full-scale introduction of a CBDC into circulation. In particular, the Law’s limitation of the form of monetary instruments to paper money and coins makes it difficult to accommodate the digital manat within the existing legal framework. Therefore, before a CBDC is introduced into circulation, it would be appropriate for the legislation to expressly establish that its issuance falls within the powers of the Central Bank and that the digital form is one of the legally recognised forms of the manat.
In addition, the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Central Bank should establish a separate definition of central bank digital currency (digital manat), specifying that it is a form of digital money issued by the Central Bank, denominated in manat, and constituting a direct liability of the Central Bank. This would allow the CBDC to be legally distinguished from commercial bank deposits and from electronic money regulated by the Law on Payment Services and Payment Systems.
At the same time, the legal tender status of the digital manat and the legal conditions governing its acceptance should be established, while convertibility between cash and digital manat at par value should be ensured. To prevent the introduction of a CBDC from displacing existing forms of money, continued public access to cash should also be guaranteed at the legislative level.
The Central Bank should also be granted clear regulatory authority to establish rules governing the issuance and circulation of CBDCs, including the rules for their use and holding. Such authority could also extend to setting limits on the amount of digital manat that an individual may hold, depending on the impact of the CBDC on financial stability, as well as establishing rules on the payment of interest on CBDC holdings where necessary.
We consider it important to draw on the experience of other countries in developing the regulatory, institutional, and technological framework for a CBDC in Azerbaijan. For example, The Bahamas was the first country in the world to introduce a retail CBDC. The Sand Dollar was launched in October 2020.
The introduction of the Sand Dollar was carried out in stages. In 2019, the Central Bank of The Bahamas began developing the technological infrastructure for the digital Bahamian dollar, launched a pilot project on the island of Exuma in December of that year, and subsequently expanded the pilot to Abaco. Conducting the pilot phase on individual islands made it possible to test the technical, legal, and other features of the CBDC under real-world conditions before nationwide implementation. In particular, the Abaco pilot also included testing alternative communication arrangements that could enable the restoration of financial services following natural disasters.
In parallel with the pilot phase, measures were taken to establish the legal framework for the introduction of the CBDC. As early as 2019, the Central Bank stated that the functional features of the digital currency would be accompanied by relevant policy and legislative reforms, and that the new Central Bank legislation then under development would provide the legal basis for regulating the digital currency. The regulatory framework was intended to include safeguards to ensure compliance with exchange control requirements, monitoring and supervisory mechanisms for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, as well as mechanisms to ensure that the digital currency would not significantly displace existing banking services.
The introduction of a CBDC in The Bahamas was also accompanied by significant legislative changes. In 2020, the previous Central Bank of The Bahamas Act was repealed and replaced by the new Central Bank of The Bahamas Act 2020. One of the key innovations of the new Act in relation to CBDCs was the express recognition of the Central Bank’s authority to issue currency in electronic form and the granting of legal tender status to such digital money. The Act also defined “currency” to include electronic money issued by the Central Bank.
Compare:
- Central Bank of The Bahamas Act 2020, section 8:
(1) The currency of The Bahamas shall comprise notes, coins and electronic money issued by the Bank under the provisions of this Act. (2) The unit of the currency of The Bahamas shall be the dollar, which shall be divided into one hundred cents.
- Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the Central Bank, Article 36.1:
The monetary unit of the Republic of Azerbaijan is the manat. One manat consists of 100 (one hundred) gapiks. Monetary instruments may be put into circulation in the form of paper money and coins.
This was followed by the adoption of the Bahamian Dollar Digital Currency Regulations 2021 to provide more specific regulation of the CBDC, setting out the legal status of the Sand Dollar and the principal rules governing its use in greater detail. These Regulations are aimed at providing more detailed regulation of the activities of payment service providers offering CBDC-related services, the protection of user funds and data, the security of financial infrastructure, AML/CFT requirements, financial inclusion, and consumer protection32 . This approach could also be useful for Azerbaijan. The basic legal status of the CBDC and the authority to issue it could be established at the legislative level, while its use, holding limits, and other technical matters could be regulated either by a separate law or by regulatory acts of the Central Bank.
Another relevant example is the introduction of the digital yuan (e-CNY) in the People’s Republic of China. In addition to adopting a phased pilot approach to the introduction of its CBDC, China has sought to strike a balance between privacy and AML/CFT requirements. The e-CNY system applies the principle of “managed anonymity”, based on the approach of “anonymity for small-value transactions and traceability for large-value transactions”. Different tiers of digital wallets are established according to the amount of identification information provided by users, with different balance and transaction limits applying to each tier. While the lowest-tier wallet can be opened using only a mobile phone number, access to higher limits requires the provision of additional identification information
On the other hand, in order to combat illegal and criminal activities, including telecommunications fraud, online gambling, and money laundering, authorised operators are required to apply AML/CFT requirements to e-CNY transactions and report large-value and suspicious transactions to Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). Where a suspicious or unlawful transaction is identified, FIUs or law-enforcement authorities may, where there is an appropriate legal basis, obtain the user’s real identity information from telecommunications operators34 . Thus, although a certain degree of anonymity is preserved in China for low-value everyday transactions, this anonymity is not absolute and does not prevent the investigation of unlawful activities.
In our view, certain elements of a similar approach could also be used when developing the legal framework for the digital manat in Azerbaijan. Although the digital nature of a CBDC creates additional opportunities for detecting and tracing suspicious financial transactions, these possibilities should not lead to unjustified restrictions on user privacy. In this respect, the introduction of a risk-based and differentiated identification mechanism could be considered. In other words, the identification information required for low-value and low-risk everyday transactions could be kept to a minimum, while stronger identification and monitoring measures could be applied to higher-value or higher-risk transactions.
In addition, particular attention should be given to limiting the impact of a CBDC on financial stability in the legal design of Azerbaijan’s CBDC. For this purpose, the safeguards discussed in the literature can generally be divided into quantity-based and price-based measures. Quantity-based measures include limits on the amount of CBDC that an individual may hold at any one time (holding limits), transaction limits, and limits on the amount of funds that may be converted into CBDC within a specified period. Price-based measures may include making the CBDC non-interest-bearing, applying negative interest rates, or introducing a tiered remuneration mechanism under which different interest rates are applied depending on the amount held.
The overall purpose of these mechanisms is to preserve the function of a CBDC as a means of everyday payment while preventing it from becoming a large-scale substitute for commercial bank deposits and a means of storing substantial amounts of value. For example, a holding limit, by restricting the maximum amount of funds that a person may hold in CBDC, may reduce excessive shifts from bank deposits into CBDC during normal times and, during periods of financial stress, limit the extent to which CBDC could become a safe alternative for rapidly withdrawing funds from the banking system. Recent studies also indicate that appropriately calibrated holding limits may contain bank run risk while largely preserving the benefits of CBDC as a means of payment.
Another possible instrument is the interest policy applied to CBDC. A non-interest-bearing CBDC may be less attractive as a savings instrument than bank deposits. Under a tiered remuneration mechanism, one interest rate may apply to CBDC holdings up to a certain threshold, while a lower or negative rate may apply to the amount exceeding that threshold. In this way, holding large amounts of funds in CBDC may be made economically less attractive without restricting its use for everyday payments. The IMF also considers tiered remuneration as one of the possible design tools for reducing the risk of bank disintermediation.
The solutions discussed above are important factors to be considered in the introduction of a CBDC in Azerbaijan. Making the digital manat available to the general public in the future would mean creating an alternative to bank deposits. Therefore, before the introduction of the digital manat, its potential impact on the deposit base and funding capacity of commercial banks should be assessed, and appropriate safeguards should be considered depending on the results of that assessment. In this respect, holding and transaction limits, a non-interest-bearing CBDC, or a tiered remuneration mechanism may also be relevant for Azerbaijan. However, the specific parameters of such mechanisms should be determined on the basis of the structure of Azerbaijan’s banking system, household deposit behaviour, the level of use of cash and cashless payments, and expected demand for the digital manat. The IMF likewise emphasises that CBDC safeguards should be calibrated in light of country-specific financial stability risks and the objectives of the CBDC.
In addition, in our view, if the Central Bank is to be granted the authority to determine holding, transaction, and conversion limits for CBDC in Azerbaijan, as well as any possible interest regime, the legal basis for such authority should be established in legislation in advance. At a minimum, the legislation could provide that these measures may be applied for the purpose of preserving financial stability and establish the Central Bank’s authority to determine the relevant parameters within that framework. Given the need to adjust specific limits to changing economic and financial conditions, it appears more appropriate for the detailed parameters to be set by regulatory acts of the Central Bank.
V . Conclusion
The analysis demonstrates that CBDC, as a new digital form of central bank money, represents an important development in the evolution of the modern monetary system. Nevertheless, the introduction of a CBDC should be assessed by considering its legal and financial implications together. In particular, its potential to provide an alternative to bank deposits may create certain risks to financial stability and in terms of bank disintermediation. For this reason, the regulation of CBDCs should be based on the principles of avoiding harm to monetary and financial stability, coexisting with existing forms of money, promoting innovation and efficiency, and ensuring the primacy of public policy objectives over profit interests.
The planned introduction of a CBDC at the level of state policy in Azerbaijan makes it necessary to establish its legal and regulatory framework in advance. Despite the Central Bank’s existing issuance authority under current legislation, the fact that monetary instruments are envisaged only in paper and metal form requires the legal status of the digital manat to be separately defined. Therefore, the definition, issuance, legal tender status, and basic rules governing the circulation of the digital manat should be established in legislation, while the Central Bank should be granted appropriate regulatory powers to address more specific matters.
International experience shows that there is no single universal regulatory model for CBDCs. Therefore, the future design of the digital manat in Azerbaijan should take into account the specific characteristics of the country’s banking system and financial stability risks, ensure an appropriate balance between privacy and AML/CFT requirements, and, where necessary, employ safeguards such as holding and transaction limits and remuneration mechanisms.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AML – Anti-Money Laundering
AML/CFT – Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism
BIS – Bank for International Settlements
CBDC – Central Bank Digital Currency
CBCC – Central Bank Cryptocurrency
CFT – Countering the Financing of Terrorism
e-CNY – Digital Chinese Yuan (Digital Renminbi)
ECB – European Central Bank
ESCB – European System of Central Banks
FIU – Financial Intelligence Unit
IMF – International Monetary Fund
BIBLIOGRAPHY A.
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C. Working Papers, Reports and Institutional Publications
Bank for International Settlements, CBDCs: An Opportunity for the Monetary System (BIS Annual Economic Report 2021, ch III, 2021)
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C. Legislation and Treaties
“Azərbaycan Respublikasının Mərkəzi Bankı haqqında” Azərbaycan Respublikasının Qanunu
“Azərbaycan Respublikasında rəqəmsal inkişafın sürətləndirilməsinə dair 2026-2028-ci illər üçün Fəaliyyət Planı”nın təsdiq edilməsi haqqında Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin Sərəncamı
Central Bank of The Bahamas Act 2020 (Bahamas), No 24 of 2020
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C202/47
Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank [2016] OJ C202/230
D. Other Official and Online Materials
Azərbaycan Respublikası Mərkəzi Bankı, “Azərbaycan Respublikası Mərkəzi Bankının 2022-ci il üçün pul və maliyyə sabitliyi siyasətinin əsas istiqamətləri barədə Bəyanatı” (30 December 2021)
Central Bank of The Bahamas, “Project Sand Dollar: The Central Bank Identifies Preferred Technology Solutions Provider for Bahamas Digital Currency” (Press Release, 1 March 2019)
European Central Bank, “Profits and Losses of the ECB and the Euro Area National Central Banks: Where Do They Come From?” (updated 19 May 2023)
Müəllif: ZEYNALABİDİN HÜSEYNOV